November 2026 \ News \ DIPLOMACY | STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
WHO HOLDS THE KEYS?

In a wide-ranging conversation with Sayantan Chakravarty, Editor-in-Chief and Publisher of India Empire, Shay Gal, Founder and Principal of Line of State and former Vice-President of External Relations at Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), examines what genuine national independence means in an increasingly contested world. From India’s delicate balancing act and its evolving relationship with Israel to Africa’s quest for economic and technological sovereignty, Gal argues that true power lies not merely in political declarations, but in a nation’s ability to control its own choices, capabilities and future.

By Sayantan Chakravarty
  • Shay Gal (right) is seen with Sayantan Chakravarty

You have argued that strategic autonomy depends on more than political declarations. What does it take for a country to retain genuine freedom of action when its security, technology, infrastructure and investment depend on external partners?

Owning a defence factory does not ensure wartime production. A government can hold title to a port yet lack the authority to reopen it; it can welcome investment that transfers the decisive operating decision abroad. Strategic autonomy is decided long before the crisis.

The foreign veto is often built at home. Procurement celebrates delivery and ignores sustainment. Budgets defer reserves. Ministries confuse access granted in peacetime with rights that survive political conflict. These are choices made by elected leaders, not the inevitable price of globalisation.

A prime minister’s duty is to know which functions can be stopped, who can stop them, and which alternatives have been exercised rather than merely announced. This requires accountable institutions, funded continuity and contracts enforceable under pressure. Alliances can enlarge national freedom; they cannot replace a government’s responsibility to preserve it. Sovereignty means the capacity to act independently and bear the costs of doing so.

India maintains important relationships with Israel, the United States, Russia and the Arab world, often amid competing interests. How do you assess India’s ability to preserve its strategic autonomy while deepening these partnerships?

India’s achievement is not equidistance. It has built influence without asking Washington, Moscow, Jerusalem and Gulf capitals to share a worldview. The next test is whether those capitals take India’s security into account when bargaining with its adversaries.

Washington seeks Indian technology and markets while returning to Pakistan for regional access. Moscow supplies weapons while growing dependent on Beijing. Riyadh is central to India’s energy and investment interests, yet has signed a defence pact with Pakistan and Turkey. Israel brings technology and operational experience.

Delhi should not demand exclusivity it would never grant. It should distinguish commercial access from privileged security trust, and condition sensitive cooperation on safeguards against technology leakage, intelligence exposure and incompatible defence commitments. India’s market, industrial scale and diplomatic reach are instruments for shaping its partners’ choices before agreements are signed. India cannot remain indispensable to its partners’ prosperity and an afterthought in their security decisions.

Following Israel’s October 27 election, what issues shaped voters’ choices, and what does the outcome mean for Israel’s security priorities, its approach to the Palestinian question and its relationships across the region?

The vote denied Netanyahu’s bloc a majority in the Knesset: 53 seats against 67 outside it, including 19 held by Arab parties. There is no second-class ballot in the Jewish state.

October 7 calls for an independent inquiry into command failures and military priorities, including forces assigned to protect dispersed West Bank settlements. Unequal draft obligations must also be addressed.

The enemies Israel faces will not change with its prime minister. But a government can fight its adversaries on the battlefield while advancing their interests through its own choices. Preserving Palestinian division sustained Hamas’s rule, kept an Iranian-backed front alive, and gave Ankara leverage; the deterioration of European ties constrained Israel’s diplomatic power. Intent cannot be inferred from the outcome. Political responsibility remains.

A disarmed Hamas, a demilitarized Palestinian state under enforceable guarantees, and renewed European and Arab partnerships would deny Israel’s enemies these advantages and restore freedom of action.

What could the election outcome mean for India-Israel cooperation in defence, technology, trade and security? How should New Delhi prepare for possible changes in Israel’s domestic and foreign policy?

India-Israel relations are not an arrangement between two prime ministers. The first I2U2 leaders’ summit brought Modi together with Yair Lapid, not Netanyahu. India recognised Palestine in 1988 and continued developing defence cooperation with Israel. Delhi has never needed to abandon one interest to pursue the other.

After Israel’s election, the issue is whether this partnership remains concentrated in bilateral technology or becomes an organising element of India’s trade routes to Europe. An Israel capable of advancing an enforceable Palestinian settlement and rebuilding European relations would strengthen India’s options with Arab partners and across the Mediterranean.

New Delhi should secure continuity in joint development, implement the cybersecurity commitments, use the investment treaty in force, and advance free-trade negotiations regardless of Israel’s coalition. It should mobilise financeable port, energy and logistics projects linking the UAE, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. India should judge changes in Jerusalem by the strategic opportunities they create.




Tags: Interviews

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