November 2026 \ News \ DIPLOMACY | STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
WHO HOLDS THE KEYS?

In a wide-ranging conversation with Sayantan Chakravarty, Editor-in-Chief and Publisher of India Empire, Shay Gal, Founder and Principal of Line of State and former Vice-President of External Relations at Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), examines what genuine national independence means in an increasingly contested world. From India’s delicate balancing act and its evolving relationship with Israel to Africa’s quest for economic and technological sovereignty, Gal argues that true power lies not merely in political declarations, but in a nation’s ability to control its own choices, capabilities and future.

By Sayantan Chakravarty

India’s engagement with Africa spans infrastructure, digital technology, trade and development cooperation. What distinguishes a partnership that genuinely advances African sovereignty and prosperity from one that creates new forms of economic or technological dependence?

Across Africa, colonial railways often moved minerals towards foreign ports rather than goods between African markets. India’s opportunity is to help reverse that inherited design without becoming its new centre.

The approach is already visible. Mauritius linked its own payments network to India’s UPI; Namibia signed to develop a domestic instant-payments system using Indian technology. One links markets; the other puts a central bank in charge. Neither requires India to own every transaction.

Africa’s free-trade area belongs to its member states. Delhi can support it through interoperable payments, more efficient settlements and access for African producers to Indian markets. African businesses need to sell more to each other, not only to their former colonial markets or new external partners. When African firms grow, so does the market for Indian enterprise.

India’s strongest influence will come from African-to-African transactions its cooperation enabled, even when no Indian company appears on the invoice.

In defence, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure, purchasing technology does not necessarily confer control over it. What should India and its African partners do to develop the skills, institutions and domestic capabilities needed to operate, maintain and eventually replace critical systems?

A state that assembles a foreign-designed weapon has acquired industrial work, not necessarily the authority to improve it. The issue is who controls the next generation.

India offers a more demanding model. Its Defence Research and Development Organisation and Israel Aerospace Industries jointly developed the MRSAM air-defence system with Indian companies; Bharat Electronics and IAI later formed a venture for lifecycle support. Such institutions build capabilities local-content percentages cannot measure. Rights to future design changes must still be negotiated expressly.

India and African partners should decide before procurement who designs upgrades, controls software interfaces and testing, and certifies changes to AI and cybersecurity systems. Universities, regulators and local firms must be part of that arrangement from the outset. Contracts should finance engineering teams and research laboratories, not merely equipment and training sessions.

The strategic return comes when the partner can design a better successor, not merely operate the first delivery.

How closely are security arrangements linked to investment, infrastructure and economic growth? What should governments and businesses do to ensure that security partnerships support long-term prosperity while preserving a country’s freedom of choice?

A navy can keep a shipping lane open; it cannot make a container terminal bankable. India showed its maritime reach in 2024 when its navy rescued nineteen Pakistani sailors from Somali pirates. That mission protected navigation without asking the crew to choose a side.

Economic security begins where naval protection meets commercial predictability. Insurers must be able to price risks; investors must trust courts, port access and customs; lenders need enforceable concessions and guarantees. When any one is missing, a protected route can still be commercially unusable.

Governments should provide maritime protection and legal predictability as one policy, not treat them as separate ministries’ responsibilities. Investors must price interruption and finance resilience upfront. Performance must be judged by the trade that survives disruption, the enterprises funded and the jobs sustained.

Security should lower the cost of capital without raising the price of sovereignty. That is when power becomes shared prosperity.

Over the next five years, what practical steps should India, Israel and their African partners take to build relationships that combine security, economic growth, technological capability and genuine strategic autonomy?

The next five years require more than a trilateral declaration. India, Israel and willing African governments should establish a Western Indian Ocean-Eastern Mediterranean Economic Security Compact. African states would choose the projects and hold decision rights.

Its first mandate should integrate three functions: India’s maritime partnerships and finance; Israeli water, aquaculture and production technology; and African-owned processing, ports and export businesses. This builds on India-Africa naval cooperation, the 2026 India-Israel aquaculture agreement and Africa’s Luanda Declaration, rather than inventing institutions from scratch.

In 2027, governments should select coastal pilots, identify investors and publish obligations. By 2029, the first facilities and trade links must be operating. By 2031, independent audits of export revenues, jobs and sustainable resource use should determine expansion. No African partner should be required to adopt Delhi’s or Jerusalem’s foreign policy.

The future India-Europe corridor must make Africa a producer and decision-maker, not simply a shoreline it passes.

 




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